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PULLED PORK:
THE THREE PART ATTACK ON NON-STATUTORY
EARMARKS
Jason Heaser*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Definitions of earmarks, sometimes referred to as appropriations with a zip
code, 1 vary depending on the source.2 These varying definitions, however,
generally revolve around four factors: "specificity of the entity receiving
funding, congressional origin, exemption from normal competitive
requirements for agency funding, and presence in statutory text." 3 While an
earmark normally means any expenditure for a specific purpose that is placed
into a larger spending bill or related conference report, 4. a salient feature of
earmarks is that they involve funding directives in areas that would otherwise
demand some sort of competitive bidding process. 5 Labeling a piece of
legislation as pork implies that lapses have occurred in procedures set forth by
6
executive agencies to review and consider the expenditure of funds.
The term earmarking originates from the medieval practice of herdsman
cutting a notch in the ear of a swine as a type of brand, marking the pig as part
of his flock. 7 The more abrasive term "pork barreling" comes from the late
nineteenth century and compares legislators' action to hungry slaves crowding
a barrel of salted pork during mealtimes. 8 While often used interchangeably,
pork and earmarks are used to describe different types of specific
appropriations. 9 In the federal budget context the term earmark is used two
ways: to refer to an expenditure that is specified to be paid to a particular local
project from the general fund, or to refer to the dedication of a discrete

J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2009.
1. Rob Porter & Samuel Walsh, Earmarks in the Federal Budget Process (May 1, 2006)
(unpublished paper, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/Earmarks16.pdf).
2. The Congressional Reporting Service and Citizens Against Government Waste use two
somewhat varying definitions of earmarks.
3. Porter & Walsh, supra note 1.
4. TOM FINNIGAN, CITIZENS AGAINST GOV'T WASTE, ALL ABOUT PORK: THE ABUSE OF

EARMARKSAND THE NEEDED REFORMS (2006), http://www.cagw.org/site/DocServer/PorkFinal.
pdf.
5. Porter & Walsh, supra note 1, at 6.
6. FINNIGAN, supra note 4.
7. Tim Weiner, Sending Money to Home District: Earmarking and the Pork Barrel, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 1994, at Al.
8. FINNIGAN, supra note 4.
9. Id. at 4.

2009]

Pulled Pork

revenue. 10 This note will focus on the former of these two.
The bulk of this Note will focus on non-statutory earmarks, which do not
appear in the text of the statute itself, but are instead placed in conference
committee and manager reports. This Note will be divided into four sections: a
general background of earmarks, recent congressional action concerning
earmarks, recent executive action regarding non-statutory earmarks, and
judicial decisions that impact the use of non-statutory earmarks.
II.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF EARMARKING

Congress is granted the power to appropriate funds under Article I of the
Constitution. 11 Appropriations bills passed through Congress grant federal
agencies the authority to spend money from the Treasury. 12 While the
appropriation bill is being drafted, Congress members may submit earmark
requests to members of the appropriations committee who may then insert the
earmarks into the bill. 13 It comes as no surprise then that a disproportionate
14
number of earmarks go to appropriation committee members.
Upon passage the bill is sent to a conference committee. The conference
committee's role, which is formed by members of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, is to hammer out a negotiated bill which can then
be passed by both houses. As well as a compromise version of the bill the
conference committee also authors a conference reports. These reports are
generally thousands of pages long and are not formally presented to either
house of Congress or the President.
The modern trend of earmarking legislation is moving away from earmarks
within legislation and instead placing the earmarks in conference reports and
committee recommendations. This is not a new trend by any means as most
earmarks were placed in the statutory text until the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921,15 after which the majority of earmarks were found in conference
reports. A 2006 Congressional Service Report found over 95 percent of
16
earmarks were contained in the conference or manager's reports.
Funds which are not earmarked go to general grant programs to be doled
out by state or federal agencies through competitive processes or formulae.
Agency decisions, especially those which are targeted toward research, are also
based on peer reviews. Peer review for funding is rooted in, "history, doctrine,

10. Porter & Walsh, supra note 1, at 2-3.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. Id. at art. I, § 9.
13. In 2005 the House Appropriations Committee received almost 35,000 earmark requests.
David Baumann, Tempest in a Barrel, NAT'L J., Feb. 11, 2006, at 60, available at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0206/021306ol.htm.
14. FINNIGAN, supra note 4, at 13.
15. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) (creating the General Accounting Office, which was meant to
monitor expenditures of the federal government).
16. Robert Novak, How to Erase Earmarks, REAL CLEAR POLMCS, Mar. 27, 2006,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/03/how-to-erase earmarks.html.
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and law, as well as in its practical effectiveness in promoting academic
science.". 17. Evaluations from congressional committees, federal agencies, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Services
18
(CRS) have found peer review to be generally fair and procedurally sound.
Supporters of earmarks claim that Congress members are more in tune with
the needs of their constituencies than agency bureaucrats. There are studies
that suggest this may be true. 19. Some commentators argue differently,
suggesting earmarks feed a congressional propensity to micromanage state and
local affairs..20 . A report by the National Conference of State Legislators stated
that, though earmarking may offer advantages in assuring funding for specific
projects, it is more likely to hamper state budgetary designs and
management.21. This claim is supported by studies, which show large
percentages of federal funds normally spent at the states' discretion are
earmarked toward specific projects. 2 2, In order to combat these problems, states
have been forced to balance their attention between local leaders and Congress
members in Washington D.C. The Colorado Department of Transportation
(DOT) has set up a competitive process where they hear project requests from
local leaders and then submit those requests to the Colorado congressional
23
delegation.
Some Congressional earmarks are passed even though they may be
contrary to state and local needs. 2 4 In a 2005 appropriations bill Rep. John
Salazar (D-Col.) secured a $6.2 million earmark for a bridge in Glenwood
Springs, Colorado..25. The project has been dubbed a local "bridge to nowhere"
because there is no connecting road on the other side of the river..26. Further, the
chairman of the Colorado committee that evaluates transportation projects
lobbied against the earmark, stating that the project was unnecessary. 27. The
original "bridge to nowhere" was an earmark project lead by Sen. Ted Stevens
(R-Alaska) and Rep. Don Young (R-Alaska) which included $223 million dollars
to connect Ketchikan, population roughly 15,000, to Gravina Island, population

17. JAMES SAVAGE, FUNDING SCIENCE IN AMERICA: CONGRESS, UNIVERSITIES AND THE POLITICS OF
THE ACADEMIC PORK BARREL 5-6 (1999).
18. Id. at 37-39.

19. See Brian Freil, Defending Pork, NAT'L J., May 8, 2004, at 1406, available at
http://www.govexec.com/ dailyfed/0504/051004njl.htm.
20. Ronald D. Utt, How Congressional Earmarks and Pork-Barrel Spending Undermine State and
Local Decisionmaking, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2, 1999, at 2, 5,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/upload/18432_1.pdf.
21. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FACT SHEET: BUDGET ISSUES, EARMARKING IN THE FED. GOV'T, at

10 (1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai95216f.pdf.
22. See PA. LEGIS. BUDGET AND FINANCE COMM., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: DEP'T OF TRANSP.,

PURSUANT TO ACT 1981-95,187 (1996) (finding that over 25% of federal funds were earmarked).
23. Freil, supra note 19.
24. Utt, supranote 20 at 6-7.
25. Bob Cusack, Bipartisanship a Likely Casualty of Earmark Reform, THE HILL, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://thehill.com/ leading-the-news/bipartisanship-a-likely-casualty-of-earmark-reform-2006-0216.html.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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50.28
Senator Stevens successfully defended the earmark against an
amendment, which would have diverted the funds to help replace a bridge
which was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. When Rep. Young was asked
about Alaskan constituents who supported diverting the funds as a gift from
the Alaskan people he responded, "They can kiss my ear! That is the dumbest
29
thing I've ever heard."
Earmarking for local projects also has the threat of putting national
programs in jeopardy.
In 2006, the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act earmarked $36 million for seventeen energy related projects
in Nevada. 30 However, this earmark steered funds away from established
energy projects; such as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden,
Colorado, which was forced to lay off eleven percent of its total staff. 31 The
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation and Assistance Act of 198732
contained earmarks beneficial to twenty-one states. These benefits were
secured at the cost of fifteen other states who received substantially less funds
as a result. 3 3 On a more currently relevant scale, in 2004, the OMB warned that
continued reduction and addition though earmarking would damage future
34
military capabilities.
Supporters portray earmarks as a coalition building tool and necessary in
building a majority to pass critical legislation. 35 Earmarks help build coalitions
because neither Congress members will likely vote down an entire bill because
of an individual earmark, nor can the President veto a bill for a single earmark
without vetoing the entire bill, therefore allowing earmark spending to cross
36
party lines and build a bipartisan coalition.
Whether blatant-as the case of Rep. Randy Cunningham (R-Calif.), who
resigned from Congress and pled guilty to conspiring to take $2.4 million in
bribes from two defense contractors who had received earmarks through his
legislative efforts 37 -or more clandestine- such as Rep. Alan Mollohan (DW.Va.), who directed $250 million to five newly created non-profits and then

28. Shailagh Murray, For a Senate Foe of Pork Barrel Spending, Two Bridges Too Far,WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 2005, at A8.
29. Id.
30. H.R. REP No. 109-275 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong-reports&docid=f:hr275.109.pdf.
31. Press Release, Citizens Against Government Waste, Senator Reid is December Porker of the
Month, (Dec. 25, 2005), availableat http://www.cagw.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=
9556.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987).
33. U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFIcE, HIGHWAY DEMONSTRATION PROJECrS: IMPROVED SELECTION
AND FUNDING CONTROLS ARE NEEDED, RCED-91-146, 7 (1991).
34. In the 2005 DoD Authorization Bill, Congress cut $4.5 billion of DoD requests but inserted
an additional $8.9 billion in earmarks. Winslow Wheeler, Don't Mind if I Do: Congress Says It's Going
All Out for Troops. Here's $8.9 Billion in Pork That Says It's Not, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2004, at B1.
35. See DIANA EVANS, GREASING THE WHEELS: USING PORK BARREL PROJECTS TO BUILD MAJORITY
COALMONS IN CONGRESS (2004).
36. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Earmark- It's $$$, Not Body Art, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2006 at A17.
37. Finlay Lewis, Jerry Kammer, and Joe Cantlupe, ContractorAdmits Bribing Cunningham, THE
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 2006, at Al.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 35:1

recruited friends and former aides to run the organizations - the ability of
earmarks to be used as a corruptive tool is seldom questioned. 38 Despite these
obvious signs of abuse, few Congress members are willing to act against
earmarking legislation.
Congressman Jim Moran (D-Va.) declared at a
fundraiser, "[w]hen I become chairman [of a House Appropriations
39
subcommittee], I'm going to earmark the shit out of it."
Those that support earmarks argue that the process of using earmarks has
been around since the days of Washington. 40 Critics on the other hand point to
modern ubiquitous proliferation of earmarks as a new concept spawning
mostly from the 1980's.41 Comparative studies have shown that the number of
individual earmarks has increased dramatically, especially in the last ten
42
years.
Both the Executive and some members of the legislature have questioned
the constitutional ability of Congress to specify in detail its appropriations bills
since the early days of the Republic. When a measure was brought before
Congress which would offer a bounty to New England, cod fisherman Rep.
Hugh Williamson of the Second Congress argued against it, saying the effort to
spend federal funds in a manner so localized was unconstitutional:
[T]to gratify one part of the Union by suppressing the other... destroy[s] this
barrier, -and it is not a few fishermen that will enter, but all manner of

persons; people of every trade and occupation may enter in at the breach,
43
until they have eaten up the bread of our children.
Thomas Jefferson himself argued against the localized appropriation of funds
even to support the constitutionally required task of establishing a postal
service. 44 Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison, challenging his proposal for
road improvements for the postal service and stating he viewed such individual
appropriations:
[A] source of boundless patronage to the executive, jobbing to members of

38. Judi Rudoren, Special Projects By Congressman Draw Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2006
available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2006/04/08/washington/08earmarks.html (Rep. Mollohan
resigned his position as chair of the House Ethics Committee soon after news of these earmarks was
released.).
39. Scott McCaggrey, Moran: Democratic Majority Means More Money for 8th District, SUN
GAZETTE
NEWSPAPERS,
June
10,
2006
available
at
http://sungazette.net/articles/2006/06/11/arlington/news/nws936e. txt.
40. Janet Hool and Richard Simon, Earmarking-A Win-Win for Lobbyists and Politicians, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006 available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/012906.htm.
41. FINNIGAN, supra note 4.
42. BRIAN

RIEDL,

HERITAGE

FOUNDATION,

http://www.heritage.org/research/budget/wm1757.cfm
having increased from 958 in 1996 11338 in 2007.).

OMNIBUS

EARMARKS

OUT

(2007),

(finding the number of earmarks as

43. JOHN C. EASTMAN, THE CLAREMONT INSTITUTE, EATING UP THE BREAD OF OUR CHILDREN,

(2006), http://www.claremont.org/projects/jurisprudence/060206eastman.html.
44. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
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Congress and their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money ... it will

be a scene of eternal scramble among the members, who can get the most
money wasted in their State; and they will always get most who are
45
meanest."
Multiple Presidents and numerous founding fathers have agreed in Jefferson's
analysis of the dangers and constitutionality of earmarks. Alexander Hamilton
did not believe Congressional powers extended to spending of a local or
regional benefit. 46 James Monroe argued that federal money should be limited
"to great national works only, since if it were unlimited it would be liable to
abuse and might be productive of evil." 47 Grover Cleveland vetoed numerous
appropriation bills, stating his only reason, "I can find no warrant for such an
appropriation in the Constitution." 48 James Madison went so far as to veto a
public works bill that specified it would be put toward roads and canals. 49 He
took a strict interpretation of the congressional powers within Article I of the
Constitution, stating that the Common Defense and General Welfare clauses
50
did not grant Congress additional powers not otherwise enumerated.
More recently, Ronald Reagan vetoed the Surface Transportation and
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 for its inclusion of earmarks, stating,
"I haven't seen this much lard since I handed out blue ribbons at the Iowa State
Fair." That bill only contained 121 earmarks. 51 In comparison the 2005
Labor/HHS Appropriations Act contained over 3000 earmarks totaling 1.69
52
billion dollars.
III.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION

House Joint Resolution 20, The Revised Continuing Appropriations
Resolution of 2007, includes the most direct action that Congress has taken in
eliminating earmarks within committee reports. 53 The resolution itself is a
continuing resolution of appropriations for fiscal year 2007 and other purposes.
However it includes a provision which states, "[any language specifying an
earmark in a committee report or statement of managers accompanying an
appropriation Act for fiscal year 2006, shall have no legal effect with respect to

45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 6, 1796) (on file with The Thomas
Jefferson Papers, The Library of Congress).
46. EASTMAN, supra note 43.
47. Ken Silberstein, The Great American Pork Barrel, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 1, 2005.
48. WALTER E. WILLIAMS, GEORGE MASON

UNIVERSrTY, How DID WE GET HERE? (2004),

www.gmu.edu/ departments/economics/ wew/articles/fee/here.html.
49. Letter from James Madison to the U.S. House of Representatives, Veto of federal public works
bill, available at www.constitution.org/jm/18170303 _yeto.htm.
50. Id.
51. U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND UNIFORM RELOCATION ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1987, (2005), available at

www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/rw0le.htm.
52. CITIZENS

AGAINST

GOVERNMENT

WASTE,

2005

http://www.cagw.org/site/DocServer/2005_Pig-Book.pdf.
53. H.J. Res. 20, 110 Cong. (2007)

CONGRESSIONAL

PIG

BOOK,

(2005),

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 35:1

funds appropriated... ".54. This shows that Congress at least understands it has
the power to eliminate non-statutory earmarks through its own legislation.
While many legislators rail against earmark corruption, legislation focused
on the elimination of earmarks has been slow and has bore limited fruit. Even
following the aforementioned scandals, Congress has passed only one piece of
legislation that was meant to curb earmark use..55. Both the House and Senate
attempted to pass legislation in 2006 that would have made mandatory
disclosure of all earmarks requested and received by list of the requesting
Congress members. 56. Ultimately, the House and Senate could not reconcile
their differences in the bills, and it would not be until the 110th Congress came
to power that earmark legislation would be passed into law..57. The first
significant legislation passed by the 110th Congress was the Honest Leadership
and Open Government Act of 2007.58. The HLOG mandates all earmarks within
59
the bill be listed along with the requesting member..
Earmark reform continues to be a hot topic in both houses of Congress.
Several members including Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.) and Karen McCaskill
(D.-Mo.), have continued to push for stronger and more effective means of
limiting earmark use. The use of earmarks also became an item of discussion for
both presidential tickets in 2008.
IV.

RECENT EXECUTIVE ACTION

Several administrations have objected that committee reports do not carry
the force of law because they are not presented to both houses, nor are they
presented to the President for approval.60 . During the Reagan Administration,
OMB director James Miller wrote a letter to the federal agencies instructing
them to ignore conference report earmarks. Miller argued that the conference
report language was "neither voted on by Congress nor presented to the
President, [so they] are not law.".61. It should be noted that after Miller
informed Congress in writing that the Reagan Administration would ignore
earmarks as non-binding, several committee chairmen refused to deal with
Director Miller. Thus, his ability to advocate for President's policies was
compromised..62 Congress even responded with threats of retaliation, and

54. Id. at § 112.
55. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
56. Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006, S.2349, 109th Cong. (2006);
Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, H.4975 109th Cong. (2006).
57. Jeffrey Birnbaum, House Votes to Disclose Earmarks,WASH. POST, September 15, 2006, at Al.
The House of Representatives was able to pass a rule change which mandated a list of earmarks
and the requesting representative accompany each bill.
58. Pub.L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007).
59. Id. at Title II.
60. John F. Cooney, Signing Statements: A Practical Analysis of the ABA Task Force Report, 59
ADMIN. L. REv. 647, 663 (2007).
61. JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH
OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 37 (1996).
62. Cooney, supra note 60, at 663-64.
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Miller soon capitulated sending another letter reversing his earlier
instructions. 63 This shows that in practice, the White House may be compelled
to treat the earmarks as binding for fear of retribution by the Appropriations
64
Subcommittees and Congress as a whole.
President George W. Bush first indicated an intention to ignore conference
report language when he inserted a signing statement in H.R. 2863, which
stated that the Administration would construe the bill in a manner consistent
with the bicameral passage and presentment requirements of the
Constitution.65 On January 29, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order
13,457 (the Order), "Protecting American Taxpayers from Government
Spending on Wasteful Earmarks." 66 The Order states the government must
ensure the proper use of taxpayer funds that are appropriated for government
functions. In order to achieve this, the number and cost of earmarks must be
reduced. 67 The Order further commands executive agencies not to "commit,
obligate, or expend" funds on the bases of earmarks that originate from a nonstatutory source except when required by law or when the agency has
68
independently determined the merit of the expenditure.
The Order takes a comprehensive definition of earmarks:
[T]he term "earmark" means funds provided by the Congress for projects,
programs, or grants where the purported congressional direction (whether in
statutory text, report language, or other communication) circumvents
otherwise applicable merit-based or competitive allocation processes, or
specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the
executive branch to manage its statutory and constitutional responsibilities
69
pertaining to the funds allocation process.
The Order also identifies four duties of agency heads relating to earmarks.
First, the agency head must take all necessary steps to implement the order as a
bar to non-statutory earmarks. This duty entails ensuring all agency allocations
are based on statutory text and not on committee reports or explanatory
language. 70 Agency heads must also ensure all allocation decisions are based
on, "authorized, transparent, statutory criteria and merit-based decision
making," in accordance with OMB Memorandum M-07-10 to the extent
consistent with applicable law. 71 OMB Memorandum M-07-10 72 was issued on

63. KORN, supra note 61.
64. Cooney, supra note 60.
65. Press Release on the White House, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the
"Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 47 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1918, (Jan. 292008),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2005/12/20051230-8.html.
66. Exec. Order No. 13,457, 73 Fed. Reg. 6417 (2008).
67. Id. at § 1.
68. Id.
69. Id. at § 3(b).
70. Exec. Order No. 13,457, 73 Fed. Reg. 6417 § 2(a)(i) (2008).
71. Id. at § 2(a)(ii).
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February 15, 2007 and explains the impact of the moratorium of earmarks
under H.J.Res. 20. 7 3 Apropos to this note is the section indicating all agency
heads must use statutory guidance in their decisions regarding allocations
which stem from the fiscal year 2006 appropriation bills affected by section 112
of H.J.Res. 20. 74
The second duty relayed by the Order is the agency may not factor into
consideration of funding communication, which is purely oral. Further, the
agency must make public, via the internet, all written requests for earmark
expenditures from Congressional members or staff. 75
The third duty instructs the agency heads to follow implementation
procedures as further provided by the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget. 76 The fourth duty allows the Director of the OMB to demand
information from agency heads regarding compliance with the order. 77
The impact of the Order will be stifled somewhat by the last provision,
which states, "[tjhis order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party
against the United States, its agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person." 78 Similar language in Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,866 has been interpreted to indicate the lack of any private
cause of action against an agency. 79 Therefore, any private litigant would have
to seek a cause following the Bonneville Power theory of administration action
under the APA. 80
Some discussion of Executive powers in regard to legislative interpretation
is necessary to refute the possible argument that Executive Order 13,457 is an
unconstitutional extension of the President's power. The President's power to
issue executive orders stems both from constitutional authority, as granted
under Article II, and express or implied statutory authority. If these Orders are
issued under a valid claim of authority, they may have the force and effect of
81
law, which would force courts to take judicial notice of their existence.
Under a Steel Seizure Case analysis the Order appears to fall within the third
category, as it is directly ordering agencies to ignore the implied will of
Congress as shown through their legislative history. 82 The Order may still be a

72. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M07-10, PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES ABOUT OBLIGATING FY 2007 FUNDS
UNDER A FULL-YEAR CONTINUING RESOLUTION (CR) WITH NO CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS (2007),

availableat http://management.energy.gov/Februaryl5GuidanceMemorandum.pdf.
73. See, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74. OMB, supra note 72.
75. Exec. Order 13,457, 73 Fed. Reg. 6417, § 2(b) (lan. 29, 2008).
76. Id. at § 2(c).
77. Id. at § 2(d).
78. Id. at § 3(c).
79. Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 954 F.Supp. 383, 390 (D.Me. 1997).
80. Infra note 123.
81. See Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154 (1871); see also Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
82. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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valid Executive action because the courts, as will be shown in the following
section, have made it clear that the power to enforce language in committee
83
reports lies firmly and solely with the Executive.
Further, Presidential restriction of agency rulemaking has become a widely
used and accepted mechanism by which a President can exert determinative
authority over agencies' actions. 84 President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291
established a centralized review procedure and required all new agency
regulations to include a cost-benefit analysis. 85 This broadening of Presidential
power over agency decision-making was met with controversy. 86 The Supreme
Court did not offer a decision on 12,291 and lower courts refused to reach the
constitutional issues 87 prior to its revocation by President Clinton. 88 Similarly,
no court has thus far ruled on the similar language in Executive Order 12,866.
However, courts have upheld compliance with the order without deciding on
the constitutional question.89
The Executive cannot, however, refuse to spend money in the face of a,
"clear statutory intent and directive to do so." 90 It seems clear that language
within the congressional committee reports falls outside of "clear statutory
intent and directive" and, therefore, the Executive may legally ignore such
earmarks. This does not mean agencies may freely ignore clearly expressed
legislative intent applicable to appropriations. Such actions are taken at the
peril of strained relations with Congress. However, the agencies' practical duty
to abide by the expressed intent of Congress falls short of a statutory
requirement which would give rise to legal action, should there be a failure to
carry out that duty. 91
Surviving a constitutional challenge, Congress still has many options in
dealing with the implications of the Order. Working within the new
framework, the most obvious is to include all earmarks in the text of the statute.

concurring). Justice Jackson's three category analysis has generally been recognized as the most
persuasive breakdown of Executive Power. The first category included Executive actions taken
under express or implied congressional authority. The second category included Executive actions
taken without congressional direction on the matter. The third category includes executive actions
which run contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress. Under this last category the
Executive action is only valid if the exclusive power to act rests with the Executive.
83. See infra Part III.
84. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, EARMARKS EXECUTIVE
ORDER: LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2008).

85. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)).
86. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 4-6 (1995).
87. See American Ass'n of Retired Persons v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 823
F.2d 600, 603 (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479,
1507 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
88. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). While 12,866 explicitly revoked
12,291 it retained the high degree of Presidential review of agency decisions including review by
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and cost benefit analyses.
89. See Cronin v. Browner, 90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
90. Nat'l Council of Cmty. Mental Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F.Supp. 897 (D.C. 1973).
91. LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 308, 325 (1975).
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This would make appropriations bills even more bulky and cumulative. 92
Congress could also include language within the statute which gives the
committee report force of law; such as, "[aippropriation instructions in joint
explanatory statement House Report No. 110-XXX shall be effective as if
enacted into law." 93. A third option would be to expressly anchor the
committee report earmark to language within the legislation. 94 This approach
has precedent in the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolutions of 2007
which provided: "[t]he Office of National Drug Control Policy shall expend
funds for 'Counterdrug Technology Center' ... in accordance with the joint
explanatory statement of the committee of conference." 9 5 This type of direct
and unambiguous language would appear to confer legally binding status to
the congressional report. The Supreme Court has held that, "the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
96
Congress.".
Congress may decide that instead of working within the parameters set by
the Order, they will fight the President on its implementation. As stated
previously, the greatest battles will most likely be fought in the political arena.
This will force agency heads to choose between following the letter of the Order
and possibly aggravating committee chairs, and ignoring the order to appease
the individuals who annually decide the agency's budget.
Legally, Congress has the option of revoking the Order through legislation.
This action has precedent in the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act
97
of 1993, which stated Executive Order 12,806 "shall not have any legal effect..
Another more controversial option for Congress would be to deny funds to the
98
Office of Management and Budget to enforce the Order..
Regardless of Congress' response, it appears as if President Bush has set the
force of the Executive against the enforcement of non-statutory earmarks. If the
Order is followed literally, it will virtually end non-statutory earmarks and lead
to the transparency of the earmarking process as well as the appropriations
process on whole.
V.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The courts had not until fairly recently weighed in on the legality of
earmarks. Their decisions have found that there is no force of law in non-

92. H.R. 2764, 110th Cong. (2007). The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 was over 3400
pages long, and over 300 earmarked projects were not in the text.
93. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, EARMARKS EXECUTIVE
ORDER: LEGAL ISSUES 10 (2008).

94. Id.
95. Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolutions of 2007, Pub..L. No. 110-5, chap. 10, §
21057(b), 121 Stat. 8, 55 (2007).
96. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
97. National Institute of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.103-43, § 121(c), 107 Stat.
133 (1993).
98. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, EARMARKS ExECUTFvE
ORDER: LEGAL ISSUES 10 (2008).
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statutory earmarks that do not have an anchor within the text of the legislation.
A more recent case even finds that agency decisions must be judicially reversed
where the agency decision depends on non-statutory earmark language as a
basis for its decision.
The Court of Federal Claims ruled on the force of non-statutory earmarks in
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. United States. 99 The case involved a
contract action where a contractor was refused his agreed-upon settlement
payment because of language in the conference report and statute that removed
settlement authority from the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. The Court
noted that several congress members expressed their disfavor for the settlement
deal and, after being rebuked by the VA Administrator, placed an amendment
within a conference report which stripped the Administrator of his ability to
contract in settlement for amounts greater than one million dollars. 100 The
Court found the amounts earmarked for individual items are not binding
unless those items and their amounts are carried into the language of the
appropriations bill itself.1° 1 The Court's discussion of appropriation earmarks
is dicta though, for before the case was heard the Senators had placed restrictive
10 2
language within the Statute, thus making the case moot.
The D.C. Circuit Court in International Union v. Donovan agreed with the
lack of force of non-statutory earmarks. 10 3 In an opinion written by current
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court upheld the Secretary of
Labor's discretion to withhold funding to training programs not specifically
mentioned in statutory text. 10 4 The Court cited the authority of the General
Accounting Office and its consistent interpretation that lump-sum
appropriations created no requirement that the agency use the money for one
project over another. 10 5 Then-Judge Scalia went on to state: "[a] lump sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to
distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees
fit."1 06 The Court also found that the only way Congress could mandate any
type of spending is through the enactment of legislation. 10 7 The Court did
concede that as a political matter the agency's relationship with Congress might
demand that certain budget justifications be followed. 10 8 In refusing to
overturn the decision, the Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the Secretary's allocation where the action is committed to agency
discretion by law. 10 9 Agency action is committed to agency discretion where

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. United States, 622 F.2d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
Id. at 544.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 553.
Int'l Union v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 860-861.
Id. at 862.
Int'l Union, 746 F.2d at 863 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982)).
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110
statutes are drawn in such broad terms that there is no law to apply.
The Supreme Court holds a similar view as to the lack of any binding
authority for conference report language.I"' In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Director of
Indian Services cut a program for handicapped Indian children in the
Southwest. Congress was aware of the program but never allocated funds
directly for it. 11 2 The Court's opinion affirmed that the allocation of funds from
a lump sum appropriation is such an action to be regarded as committed to
agency discretion and therefore outside the scrutiny of judicial review..113
Justice Souter went further, however, and discussed the discretion which
agencies enjoy with regard to lump-sum appropriations:

[A] fundamental principle of appropriations law that where 'Congress merely
appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can be
done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to
impose legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee reports and
other legislative history as to how the funds should, or are expected to be
114
spent do not establish any legal requirements on' the agency.
Further discussion revolved around the need for agency discretion at the very
point of a lump-sum appropriation, in order to give an agency the capacity to
adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what
it sees as the most effective or desirable way. 115 Justice Souter does, however,
recognize that ignoring congressional expectations may have grave political
consequences. 116
The Court in Lincoln liberally quoted a 1975 decision by the head of the
General Accounting Office, the Comptroller General. 117 The Comptroller's
decision clarified the distinction between the legally binding effect of conditions
or restrictions Congress placed in the text of the statute and the nonbinding
specifying of conditions or restrictions Congress placed in non-statutory
language." 8 The decision also warned of the distinction between using
legislative history to understand statutory language and "resorting to that
history for writing into law that which is not there." 119 The Comptroller
General decision also noticed the dangers of earmarks in general:
To establish as a matter of law specific restrictions covering the detailed and
complete basis upon which appropriated funds are understood to be
110. Id. (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971)).
111. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993).
112. Id. at 183.
113. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
114. Id. at 192 (quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307, 319 (1975)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 193.
117. LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307 (1975). In 2004 the General Accounting Office
changed its name to the Government Accountability Office.
118. Id. at 325.
119. Id.
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provided would, as a practical matter, severely limit the capability of
120
agencies to accommodate changing conditions.

A year later the Supreme Court entrenched its position regarding
committee report language. In Shannon v. United States the Court focused on
the fact that the requested action was based upon language which was not
specifically anchored to language within the statute itself stating, "courts have
no authority to enforce a principal gleaned solely from legislative history that
has no statutory reference point." 121
Recently, the Supreme Court again
warned of the dangers inherent in reviewing congressional report language as
binding. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. the Court cautioned:
[Jiudicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are
not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give
unrepresentative committee members -or, worse yet, unelected staffers and
lobbyists-both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic
manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to
achieve through the statutory text. 122
The preceding decisions involve plaintiffs who desired an agency to do
something, and attempted to use conference reports as a basis to force that
agency into action. The decisions confirm the language in a conference report
does not carry the force of law; however, they give no indication of the possible
ramifications that would result an agency treating said instructions as law.
The Ninth Circuit in Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Bonneville
Power Administration answers that very question. 123 The Bonneville Power
Administration ("BPA"), a federal agency within the Department of Energy,
sells power from power plants in the northwest. 124
One of the BPA's
obligations is to oversee and fund the Fish Passage Center ("FPC), which was
created to gather data and inform the public of fish passage problems along the
Columbia River. 125
In response to language in two 2005 congressional
committee reports, the BPA transferred the functions of the FPC to Battelle
Pacific Northwest
Laboratory
and Pacific States Marine
Fisheries
26
Commission.1
The Northwest Environmental Defense Center sought relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The APA states a court must set aside an
agency's action if the action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

120. Id.
121. 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C.Cir. 1987)).
122. 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
123. 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007).
124. Id. at 672.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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or otherwise not in accordance with the law."1 27. The related conference
committee report included the following language: "The Bonneville Power and
Administration may make no new obligations in support of the Fish Passage
Center ...to ensure an orderly transfer of the Fish Passage Center functions ...
within 120 days of enactment of this legislation."128. However the statutory
language of the 2006 Appropriations Act, to which the reports were attached,
1 29
made no mention of the FPC.
The court interpreted BPA Vice President Gregory Delwiche's adherence to
the committee report language to imply BPA treated the committee report
language as placing a legal obligation on BPA to transfer the functions of the
FPC. 130 . Using Supreme Court precedents the court found such legal obligation
contrary to existing law:
The case law of the Supreme Court and our court establishes that legislative
history, un-tethered to text in an enacted statute, has no compulsive legal
effect. It was thus contrary to law for BPA to conclude, from committee
report language alone, that it was bound to transfer the functions of the
131
FPC.
The court also found constitutional grounds for finding BPA's action
contrary to law. 132. Article I, as interpreted by the court, demands that legally
binding legislation be subject to bicameralism and presentment..133 The court
indicated altering the legal duties of agencies falls under the actions which
require legally binding legislation.. 1 34, Allowing Congress to create law through
1 35
non-statutory language would make an "end run around" the Constitution.
The court also found BPA's adherence to non-statutory language violated
the principle of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution because nonstatutory text does not follow the constitutionally mandated safeguards of
legislation. 136 Delwiche stated in court, "I did not think that, as an Executive
Branch agency, accountable to Congress, BPA could ignore this unambiguous
Congressional direction." 137 The court found allowing an agency that acted
subservient to Congress in accordance with the conference reports,
"undermines the distribution of authority in our federal government in which
138
every exercise of political power is checked and balanced.".
Bonneville Power, as it stands, seems to create a cause of action where a
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d at 681 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 109-275, at 174 (2004)).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. (interpreting U.S. Const. art. I §, 7).
Bonneville Power, 477 F.3d at 684 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 685.
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private party which has suffered harm through an agency's action in adherence
to a non-statutory earmark may, under the APA, seek injunctive relief so long
as it can prove the agency adhered to the non-statutory earmark as if it were
law and without sufficient merit based study. The decisions by all levels of
federal courts make it clear that earmarks outside the statutory text are not to be
given the force of law unless they are directly tied to statutory language. The
Ninth Circuit seems prepared to go further in overturning agency decisions
based on non-statutory earmarks.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Whether earmarks have been part of the American legislative process since
its inception, or are merely a phenomenon of the last generation, their ability to
corrupt shows more clearly than any ability to cross party lines. Numerous
members of both houses of Congress have been indicted for scandals involving
the earmarking of funds in exchange for political contributions or favors.
It is unfortunate that Congress has not made stronger efforts to curb
earmark abuse. However, it is encouraging that the ubiquitous use of nonstatutory earmarks seems to be coming to a close. If future administrations
adhere to Executive Order 13,457, agencies will continue to be forced to allocate
money along a merit-based system. Also, if the Bonneville Power decision stands
as good law, agencies will have a legal explanation against possible political
backlash for their setting aside of non-statutory earmarks, and more
importantly, citizens will have a cause of action to stop agencies from blindly
adhering to non-statutory earmarks. With judicial support from any political
backlash the executive agencies may be able to ignore non-statutory earmarks,
restore competitive processes for the funding of federal projects, and ensure
that they receive the most money those that are most worthy.

